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Abstract 
 
About 21 years after establishment of the first Islamic banks in Indonesia, the share of Islamic 
banks is still small. About 86 percent Indonesian are Muslim, yet the asset share of Indonesian 
Islamic banks is only about 4 percent. Since Islamic scholars unanimously argue that bank 
interests are prohibited, we could expect that asset share of Islamic bank in Muslim-majority 
country is at least equal with Muslim share in the total population because all Muslims should 
choose Islamic banks over conventional banks. In this paper, we want to investigate what is the 
cause of small share of Islamic banks in Indonesia. To be more precise, whether it is caused by 
non-technical factor or it is caused by supply-side problems such as poor Islamic bank services 
or lower Islamic bank returns, or to be more extreme, it may be caused by people do not 
recognize Islamic banks. Using demand estimation model and elasticity exercises, we find that 
costumers appear to group separately Islamic and conventional banks, meaning that there is 
recognition and market segmentation. However, Islamic banks do not have greater market power 
compare to conventional banks. We argue that supply-side problems such as high services fee 
and low bank returns are not the reason why the market share of Islamic banks is so low. We also 
argue that non-technical factors such as the early-mover advantages and lack Muslim awareness 
may become the reasons. We also find that Islamic banks will not be able to effectively increase 
their market share by competing in price. 
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I. Introduction 
In the last decades, we witness rapid emergence of Islamic finance. Kassim (2010) finds that 
total market of Islamic securities grows about 15-20 percent annually and the market share of 
Islamic finance will increase further due to the rapid growth of Islamic banking and finance 
industry. Institutions trying to access funds through issuing Islamic securities/funds are also 
increasing. The International Organization for Securities Commission (IOSCO) reports that there 
were 100 Islamic equity funds worldwide with assets estimated around 3.3 billion USD in 2003 
and their assets grew about 25 percent in the past seven years. Cakir and Raei (2007) find that 
sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuance was also increasing rapidly and globally, it grew around 45 
percent in 2006.  
The Islamic finance is growing faster in the Muslim-majority countries. Beck, Kunt, and 
Merrouche (2010) find that the market share of Islamic banks in Muslim-majority countries 
reached about 16 percent in 2005, increasing rapidly from only about 6 percent in 1994. This 
increase in the market share contributes significantly in increasing the market share of Islamic 
banks in global market which had reached 2 percent. Godlewski, Ariss, and Weill (2010) point 
out that sukuk Issuance in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCG) 
countries grew quickly from only 7.2 billion USD in 2004 to 39 billion USD in 2007 (43 percent 
of total global sukuk outstanding which was around 90 billion USD). 
The rapid growth in Islamic finance in the Muslim-majority countries is still considered not 
sufficient to close the gap between conventional and Islamic finance, even in Islamic banking 
industry which is considered as the most advance industry in Islamic finance. For instance, in the 
two biggest Muslim countries in East Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia, the share of Islamic banks is 
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still very small after about 20 years from establishment of the first Islamic bank in those 
countries. Assets of Islamic banks in Malaysia, which 61 percent of its populations are Muslim 
and Islam is the state religion, are only 19 percent in 2011. The gloomier picture is in Indonesia. 
About 86 percent Indonesian are Muslim, yet the asset share of Indonesian Islamic banks is only 
about 4 percent. Since Islamic scholars unanimously argue that bank interests are prohibited, we 
could expect that asset share of Islamic bank in each Muslim country is at least equal with 
Muslim share in the total population because all Muslims should choose Islamic banks over 
conventional banks. 
There are three possible reasons why market share of Islamic bank is small in Muslim-majority 
countries: Muslim has lack awareness about Islamic banks, infrastructure and quality of Islamic 
banks are significantly less than conventional bank, or conventional banks have non-technical 
advantages compared with Islamic banks. As the result, the advantage of the Islamic bank which 
is its wider demands because it could meet both demands for Islamic and conventional banking 
services will never been observed. 
Surprisingly, very few quantitative studies have been conducted to investigate whether Islamic 
banks have “abnormal” market power (such as greater market demand) from their religious 
customers, their unconditional loyal clients and also to investigate what the reason for small 
market share of Islamic banks. One of these rare studies is study conducted by Weill (2010). He 
compares market power of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the 17 countries over the 
period 2000-2007 to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater power because they have 
unique “religious” clients. He finds no significant different on market power between Islamic 
and conventional banks. Surprisingly when controlling other variables, he finds that market 
power of Islamic banks was weaker than conventional banks due to the differences in norms and 
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incentives applied across the bank’s type. Therefore, it is not surprising if Islamic bank could not 
close the gap with conventional banks.  
To enrich quantitative studies regarding market power of Islamic institution especially Islamic 
bank, in this paper, we want to investigate what is the cause of small share of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia. To be more precise, whether it is caused by non-technical factor or it is caused by 
supply-side problems such as poor Islamic bank services or lower Islamic bank returns or, to be 
more extreme, it may caused by people do not recognize Islamic banks. In this paper, we also 
want to know whether Islamic banks have greater market power. 
Using demand estimation model and Indonesian banking data, we test whether costumers in 
Indonesia differentiate between sharia and conventional banks. Then, we will investigate 
whether Islamic banks have greater market power and see whether pricing factors affect small 
market share of Islamic banks. We also test whether competing in services such as reducing fees 
and increasing returns could effectively improve market share of Islamic banks. 
We find that costumers appear to group separately Islamic and conventional banks, meaning that 
there is recognition and market segmentation. However, the Islamic banks do not have greater 
market power compare to conventional banks. We argue that supply-side problems such as high 
services fee and low bank returns are not the root of low market share of Islamic banks, therefore 
non-technical factors such as early-mover advantages and lack Muslim awareness may become 
the reason why Islamic bank’s market share is so small in Indonesia. We also argue that Islamic 
banks could not effectively increase their market share by competing in price. 
 
5 
 
II. Islamic Banks in Indonesia 
The development of Islamic bank in Indonesia follows the dual banking system which allows 
both conventional and Islamic bank to be present in the banking system. People are free to 
choose any bank according their preferences. As Muslim-majority countries, we could expect 
that most people will choose Islamic banks over conventional banks in the dual system and 
Islamic bank gradually become the leading bank. 
The first Islamic bank in Indonesia is Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI). BMI was initiated by 
National Sharia Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI). BMI officially began its operation on 
May 1992. The uniqueness of development banks of Islamic in Indonesia is bottom up process. 
The initiatives come from people, not from government. In other Muslim- majority countries, the 
process mostly is top down which government has the first initiative to establish Islamic banks. 
Until currently, MUI is still actively involved in development of Islamic finance in Indonesia, 
particularly MUI and its National Syariah Board (DSN-MUI) have responsibility to supervise the 
sharia compliance of Islamic financial institutions. 
The law number 10 year 1998 regarding the banking set another milestone for the development 
of Islamic banking. Conventional banks are allowed to provide services based on the sharia 
principles through the establishment of sharia business unit (Unit Usaha Syariah/UUS). This 
policy significantly improves the infrastructure of Islamic banking since the shariah business unit 
could utilize their parent’s infrastructure, such us branch offices and teller machines. Since April 
2007, the Bank Indonesia has permitted the sharia business unit to operate outside its parent 
branches.  
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The next milestone in the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia is the issuance of the law 
number 21 year 2008 regarding the Islamic bank. This law is the first law regulating exclusively 
Islamic bank. This law encourages conventional banks to spin off their sharia business unit to 
strengthen the line between Islamic and conventional banks. 
There are three types of Islamic banking activities in Indonesia: Islamic bank, commercial bank’s 
sharia business unit, and people credit sharia bank (BPR Syariah). Table 1 summarizes 
development of all types of Islamic bank in Indonesia. 
Table 1 
Islamic Bank by Type 2007-2012 
Type of Bank 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
General Sharia Bank 
- Number 
- Number of branch 
 
3 
401 
 
5 
581 
 
6 
711 
 
11 
1215 
 
11 
1401 
 
11 
1745 
Sharia Business Unit 
- Number 
- Number of branch 
 
26 
196 
 
27 
241 
 
25 
287 
 
23 
262 
 
24 
336 
 
24 
517 
People’s Credit Sharia Bank 
- Number 
- Number of branch 
 
114 
185 
 
131 
202 
 
138 
225 
 
150 
286 
 
155 
364 
 
158 
401 
Source: Bank Indonesia 
Almost every year, the Islamic bank grows faster than conventional bank. However, the growths 
are not sufficiently high to be able to closing the gap between Islamic and conventional banks. 
Indonesia currently has 11 Islamic banks and 23 sharia business units, significantly less than the 
number of conventional banks of 109. Asset share of Islamic banks and sharia business units is 
only about 4 percent of conventional bank’s asset.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
We collect banks’ annual financial reports 2008-2011 from the Bank Indonesia. Our sample 
covers all Islamic banks and 34 conventional banks or about 30% of population of conventional 
banks. Those conventional are randomly chosen. Our purpose not including all conventional 
banks is to balance data from Islamic banks and data from conventional banks since the number 
of Islamic bank is only 11 banks. 
Our approach is to estimate demand on deposit for both Islamic and conventional banks, then we 
test whether costumers differentiate Islamic and conventional banks. We also estimate a market 
share to price elasticity both for Islamic and conventional bank to know whether pricing policy 
(lowering service charges or increasing deposit returns) could effectively increase market share 
of Islamic bank. 
We follow Berry (1994) and Dick (2008) in modeling demand for bank deposits. The demand is 
modeled as a discrete choice. We assume that the utility function is a linear form such that the 
conditional indirect utility of consumer i from choosing bank’s j services in market k is: 
                  
        
                    (1) 
Where    
  represent interest rates/returns paid by bank,    
  represents service charges on bank 
services,     represents observed characteristic,    represents unobserved bank characteristics, 
and      is a mean zero random disturbance.  
Assuming that distribution of      follows exp(-exp(-    )), market share for bank j could be 
derived based on probability that consumer i will choose bank j conditional on bank 
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characteristics. Market share of bank j could be predicted by    
       
∑        
 
   
. Therefore, 
predicted market share only depends on mean utility level,  . As in Berry (1994), by setting the 
predicted market shares equal to observed market shares and normalizing the mean utility of the 
outside good, we could obtain: 
                  
       
              (2) 
which    represents market share of outside good. We could estimate parameter in equation (2) 
using ordinary linear regression, as well as handling possible endogeniety on price using 
standard linear instrumental variables method. 
To investigate whether consumers differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks, we use 
nested logit model as well as to reduce restriction regarding no correlation of consumer 
preference within bank categories (detailed online for this model, see Berry, 1994). Under nested 
logit model, equation (2) becomes: 
                  
       
            (    )      (3) 
Where      represent market share of bank j, which belong to group g, as the fraction of the total 
group g share. Particularly, we are interested in  . If it is statistically significant, customers 
differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks. In this regression, we also use 
instrumental variables method to handle possible endogeniety problem. 
IV. Discussion 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistic of variables. The average Islamic banks’ services fees and 
profit-sharing returns are 2.4 percent and 4.4 percent respectively. Both are less than the average 
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conventional banks’ service fees of 5.2 percent and interest rate of 6.5 percent, meaning that 
Islamic banks’ service fees are more favorable but Islamic banks’ returns are less favorable. It 
also means that the Islamic banks still have room to improve efficiency in credits management 
since their deposit returns are much less than conventional banks deposit interest rates.  
As expected, data shows that number of sample is decreasing on bank size. We have 30 small 
banks, 12 medium banks, and 3 big banks in our sample.
1
 According to their owners, our sample 
includes 22 domestic banks, 15 state-owned banks, and 8 foreign banks.
2
 
Table 4 presents our regression results. Columns 1 and 2 provide results of logit model 
regression. The coefficient signs are as we predicted, negative on service fee and positive on 
deposit interest rate/profit-sharing returns. However, only service fee is statistically significant, 
meaning that consumers consider service fees and less consider interest rate/returns in 
determining where they place their deposits.  
We are also interested in the sharia variable. Sharia is dummy variables which takes value of 1 if 
bank is Islamic bank, otherwise take value of 0. Coefficient for sharia is positive but statistically 
not significant, meaning that Islamic banks do not have greater market demands compared with 
conventional banks. 
Table 4 columns 3 and 4 provide results of the nested-logit model. The nested-logit model has 
greater flexibility than the logit model because it allows interactions between product and 
                                                          
1
 Definition of small, medium, and big bank are banks which have assets less than Rp. 2 
trillion, banks which have assets between Rp. 2 trillion and Rp. 100 trillion, and banks which 
have assets more than Rp. 100 trillion respectively. 
2
 Definition of each variable is provided in table 3 in appendix.  
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costumer characteristics while keeping the model fairly simple. As discussed in Berry (1994) and 
Dick (2008), consistent estimation of the   parameter will not require additional instruments for 
the within-market of given bank share (    ) to tackle its likely endogenous process.  
The results in the nested-logit model are similar to logit model which is statistically significant in 
the services fee and not statistically significant in the interest rates or the profit-sharing returns. 
Coefficient for sharia is also positive but statistically not significant, meaning that the Islamic 
banks do not have greater market demands. 
The   parameters in two models are statistically significant, meaning that markets appear to 
group differentially Islamic and conventional banks. In other word, there is market segmentation 
in Indonesian banking market. The   parameter is correlation parameter and it is precisely 
estimated, with a value between 0.2 to 0.3, indicating the nested strategy is appropriate.   
Overall, there is still market segmentation but this segmentation does not create the greater 
market power for the Islamic banks to be able to close the gap with the conventional banks. The 
Islamic banks’ small market share in Indonesia is also not caused by price factors. Our regression 
shows, regarding price factor, only service fees statistically affect the bank’s market share. As 
mentioned earlier, the average of the Islamic bank’s service fees is much less than the 
conventional bank’s service fee.  
We argue that the Islamic bank’s small market share in Indonesia is not caused by supply side 
problem, such as price factor as we have explained above. This may be caused by non-technical 
factor. One possible non-technical factor is the early-mover advantages as the conventional 
banks entering the bank market much earlier than the Islamic banks. Berger and Dick (2007) 
argue that there is earlier-mover advantage in banking market, meaning that banks which move 
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earlier will have greater market share than the later entrances. Another possible reason is lack 
Muslim awareness as they still prefer conventional banks when Islamic banks are available and 
also competitive. 
Table 5 provides price elasticity for each bank category in various percentiles (10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 
75
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles) to help interpretation of the coefficient magnitudes.
3
 The median 
elasticity of service fee are negative and about the same under the logit model and the nested-
logit model. The median elasticity of service fee for Islamic bank and conventional bank are 
about -0.05 and about -0.04 respectively, meaning that 1 percent decrease in bank’s service fees 
will lead to 0.05 percent increase in Islamic bank’s market share or 0.04 percent increase in 
conventional bank’s market share. 
The median elasticity of interest rates/profit-sharing returns for the Islamic bank is 1.5 (1.1 in the 
nested-logit model) and for the conventional bank is 2.2 (1.5 in the nested-logit model), meaning 
that 1 percent increase in profit-sharing returns or interest rates will lead to 1.5 percent increase 
in the Islamic bank’s market share or 2.2 percent increase in the conventional bank’s market 
share.  
This elasticity exercise shows that the Islamic banks should prefer competing in service fee 
rather than competing in returns since their service fee elasticity is greater than conventional 
banks. However, the room for additional service fee reduction is limited because the average 
Islamic bank’s service fee is already low and much less than conventional banks. The room for 
                                                          
3 We calculate own price elasticities by                under logit model, while own 
price elasticities under nested logit model by        
 
     
                 . For detail 
derivation of elasticities, see Berry (1994). 
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efficiency improvement is still available in the lending since the average of profit-sharing returns 
is much less than interest rate in conventional banks. However, the Islamic banks should not be 
dragged into interest rate “war” with the conventional banks since the magnitude of interest rate 
elasticity is higher than profit-sharing return elasticity. Overall, competing in the price is 
unfavorable for the Islamic banks because the difference in service fee elasticity between Islamic 
and conventional banks is much less than the difference between profit-sharing return elasticity 
and interest rate elasticity. This result is as we expected since Islamic banks have the “religious” 
clients, more loyal customers, who select banks not only base on prices. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Using Indonesian banking data from 1998 to 2011, we estimate demand for deposits both under 
logit model and nested-logit model, then we perform elasticity exercise for Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
We find that the average of the Islamic bank’s service fees and profit-sharing returns are lower 
than the average of the conventional bank’s service fees and interest rates. We also find that 
costumers appear to group separately Islamic and conventional banks, meaning that there is 
recognition and market segmentation. However, Islamic banks do not have greater market power 
compare to conventional banks. We argue that supply-side problems such as high services fee 
and low bank returns are not the root of the low market share of Islamic banks. We argue that the 
non-technical factors such as early-mover advantages and lack Muslim awareness may become 
the reason why Islamic bank’s market share is so small in Indonesia.  
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Our elasticity exercises show that the Islamic banks should prefer competing in the service fees 
rather than competing in the returns since their elasticity is greater than conventional bank’s 
elasticity. However, the Islamic banks may not be able to effectively increase their market share 
by competing in price because the difference in service fee elasticity between Islamic and 
conventional banks is much less than the difference between profit-sharing return elasticity and 
interest rate elasticity. 
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Appendix 
Table 2 
Summary Statistic 
 
Variables Mean Std. 
deviation 
Min Max 
Market share based on asset 0.026 0.067 0.00013 0.407 
Market share 0.026   0.047          0 0.234 
Market share per group 0.051    0.119   0.000007    0.722 
Outside good share 0.026     0.047            0 0.234 
Services fee 0.047    0.176    0.001  1.601 
Interest rate or returns 0.061   0.026   0.009   0.182 
Wages rates 0.045   0.086    0.006     0.834 
Provisions/Loans 0.033    0.061             0 0.618 
Liabilities/Assets 0.823   0.160   0.041   1.069 
Fix Assets/ Assets 0.017   0.026  0.0002  0.179 
Interconnection 0.175    0.727   0.0001  9.014 
Small (30 banks) 0.718     0.451           0 1 
Medium (12 banks) 0.218     0.414           0 1 
Big (3 banks) 0.064   0.246           0 1 
Domestic (22 banks) 0.494    0.502          0 1 
State-owned (15 banks) 0.340    0.475          0 1 
Foreign (8 banks) 0.167     0.374          0 1 
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Table 3 
Description of Variables 
 
Variables Description 
Market share based on asset Bank assets/total market assets 
Market share Bank customer deposits/total market deposits 
Market share per group Bank customer deposits/total market deposits of Islamic 
banks or conventional banks 
Outside good share Deposits from other banks/total market deposits to other 
banks 
Services fee Non-interest operational revenues/customer deposits 
Interest rate or returns Interest expenses or profit-sharing expenses/costumer 
deposits 
Wages rates Human resources expenses/(0.5*loans+0.5*customer 
deposits) 
Provisions/Loans Credit provisions/loans 
Interconnection Deposit to other banks/loans 
Small  Banks which have assets less than Rp. 2 trillion. There are 
30 small banks in our observations. 
Medium  Banks which have assets between Rp. 2 trillion and Rp. 100 
trillion. There are 12 medium banks in our observations. 
Big  Banks which have assets more than Rp. 100 trillion. There 
are 3 big banks in our observations. 
Domestic  Majority share holders are Indonesians. There are 22 
domestic private banks in our observations. 
State-owned  Majority shareholders are Indonesian governments, both 
central and/or local governments. There are 15 state-owned 
banks in our observations. 
Foreign  Majority shareholders are foreigners. There are 8 foreign 
banks in our observations. 
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Table 4 
Regression Result 
 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 
Services fee -3.387 
(1.579)** 
-3.21 
(1.559)** 
-4.143 
(1.551)*** 
-4.031 
(1.474)*** 
Interest rate or returns 35.171 
(23.888) 
35.796 
(24.173) 
-31.387 
(20.666) 
-8.758 
(24.42) 
Sharia  1.032 
(0.711) 
 0.639 
(0.637) 
Log market share per group   -0.302   
(0.124)** 
-0.271 
(0.117)** 
Constant -1.201 
(1.470) 
-1.440 
(1.59) 
1.472 
(1.02) 
1.472046    
(1.02) 
     
Number of Observations 150 150 150 150 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% significance level; Standard 
errors are in (). 
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Table 5 
First Stage Regression Result 
 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 
Wages rates 0.12 
(0.196) 
0.074 
(0.033) *** 
Provisions/Loans 0.055 
(0.21) 
0.041 
(0.035) 
Liabilities/Assets -0.101 
(0.12) 
0.049 
(0.02)** 
Fix Assets/ Assets -0.378 
(0.509) 
0.136 
(0.085) 
Interconnection 0.068 
(0.018)*** 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Medium  -0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.01 
(0.006)* 
Big  -0.058 
(0.055) 
-0.01 
(0.009) 
State-owned  0.0122253 
(0.03) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Foreign  0.183 
(0.04)*** 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Constant 0.095 
0.105 
0.019 
(0.018) 
   
Number of Observations 156 156 
R-squared 0.3 0.1 
Dependent variables in i and ii are services fee and interest rate/returns 
respectively; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
significance level; Standard errors are in (). 
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Table 6 
Price Elasticity Percentile 
Price 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Service Fees      
Sharia      
- Logit 
-0.114 -0.066 -0.054 -0.037 -0.020 
- Nested Logit 
-0.107 -0.071 -0.052 -0.035 -0.018 
Conventional      
- Logit 
-0.231 -0.072 -0.042 -0.022 -0.015 
- Nested Logit 
-0.222 -0.071 -0.041 -0.021 -0.014 
      
Interest Rates/Returns      
Sharia      
- Logit 
1.055 1.256 1.528 1.733 2.105 
- Nested Logit 
0.724 0.869 1.102 1.307 1.451 
Conventional      
- Logit 
1.170 1.685 2.194 2.690 3.226 
- Nested Logit 
0.801 1.155 1.504 1.844 2.210 
Under logit model, own price elasticities are              , while own price elasticities 
under nested logit model are        
 
     
                 . For detail derivation of 
elasticities, see Berry (1994). 
 
